The Kerberos-One- 
Introduction
The GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) mobile phone network currently connects over two billion subscribers using wireless technology. Every mobile phone uses a Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) which is a smart card that enables the phone to access the network. Cimato [6] derived the Kerberos-One-Time protocol and suggested that its implementation could be used in conjunction with a GSM Javacard (a GSM SIM that executes Java code) to provide secure communication.
Inspection of the proposed protocol led us to believe that a replay attack could potentially occur. Replay attacks [29] occur when an intruder copies an encrypted message and replays it in a different protocol instance. If the receiving agent does not realise the message is from a previous instance and continues to participate in the protocol, security may be compromised.
We are in an age that requires us to follow rigorous development processes. For example, the Common Criteria [31] , an international standard for development and evaluation of security systems, requires formal methods to be used in order to obtain the highest level of assurance (EAL7).
In this paper we take advantage of the Object-Z [11] specification language and the SAL [9] model checker to
• present a formal specification of the Kerberos-OneTime protocol;
• produce the suspected replay attack, thus verifying its existence; and
• prove that a suggested fix will prevent this or similar attacks from occurring.
General purpose state-based formalisms such as B [2] , Z [27] , and VDM [4] have seldom been used for protocol analysis despite the potential for accurate modelling of message content and agent behaviour allowed by their rich, expressive data structures.
Previously, we demonstrated the value of using the Z and Object-Z formal specification languages for verifying attacks on security protocols due to the expressive nature of these notations [15, 16] . More recently, Smith and Wildman [25] showed how Z specifications can be analysed using the SAL model checker. Their research highlighted the similarities and compatibility between the formal styles of Z and SAL. Additionally, Rushby [23] has already used the SAL model checker to verify the Needham-Schroeder Protocol. In this paper we combine these principles and show how to use SAL for automated verification of an Object-Z security protocol specification.
Review of the Kerberos-One-Time protocol
The original Kerberos protocol [28] aimed to establish new session keys for confidential communication between protocol agents. However, subsequent communication using these keys was potentially subject to replay attacks [13] . In order to ensure replay attacks are not possible, a freshness identifier must be included in each message. The KerberosOne-Time protocol [6] was derived from integration of the Kerberos protocol [28] and Lamport's one time password scheme [14] as a method of ensuring such freshness. The protocol consists of two phases as discussed in the following sections.
Establishing a session key
The following protocol describes the first phase in which a session key is established between two agents, Alice A and Bob B , via a trusted third party, Sam S .
Alice initiates the protocol by sending message 1 to Sam, containing her identity A and Bob's identity B , indicating that she wishes to establish a secure session key with Bob. Bob's identity is encrypted (denoted by '{}') using the key K AS shared by Alice and Sam.
Sam responds to Alice's request in step 2 with two encrypted messages. The first is encrypted for Alice and contains a new randomly generated session key K AB for communication with Bob and a seed w for authentication purposes. The second message (or ticket) encrypted for Bob contains the new session key, the first password (the value H t (w ) of the seed after being hashed t times), and a timestamp T .
In step 3 Alice forwards the ticket to Bob in order to establish communication with him. She also sends an authenticator -a segment encrypted with the new session key K AB that contains her identity A and the password. By decrypting the authenticator using the new session key and checking that the content of the authenticator is consistent with that of the ticket, Bob confirms that Alice is the initiating agent. As long as Bob stores all received authenticators for the lifetime of the ticket, the timestamp enables Bob to determine if this third message has been replayed.
Finally, Bob acknowledges the fact that he received the correct key for communication by replying with a modified version of the password in step 4. Alice can use this message to confirm that Bob has received the session key since the original password in step 3 can be accessed only by someone with key K BS .
Continuation of the protocol
Subsequent communication from Alice follows in the second phase of the protocol in which Alice includes the password, this time hashed t − i times where i is the i th message after initialisation.
Bob will authenticate the message based on the one time password scheme in which he hashes the password i times and compares the result with the original password received H t (w ). When all passwords for this seed have expired, i.e., when i equals the maximum number of times the seed w may be used, Bob will not accept any more messages until the seed has been renewed. However, if a message of the following form is sent, where w is a new seed for a new chain of one time passwords, there is no need to start the protocol from initialisation again [6] .
A potential weakness
According to Cimato, the use of a session key should be restricted to a short time period, avoiding the possibility of cryptanalytic attacks and limiting the number of messages compromised if the key is derived [6] .
Bob's behaviour is consistent with this requirement as we are told that on receiving message 3, which contains the new session key, Bob checks the timestamp T to ensure the message was not replayed. However, we found it strange that Alice does not make a similar check for freshness when she receives the key in step 2. This inconsistency led us to wonder whether the protocol was susceptible to a replay attack. The following sections demonstrate the approach to formal analysis taken to confirm our suspicion.
Specifying the protocol in Object-Z
Object-Z [11] is an object-oriented formal specification language in which set theory and logic is used to describe the internal states of system classes and the behaviour of class operations on those states. The advantage of using Object-Z for specifying security protocols is that it enables rigorous proof to be applied and it has powerful data structures that enable concise specifications to be written.
Based on the informal description of the protocol in Section 3 and our previous work on modelling protocols [15, 16] , we now specify this protocol in Object-Z.
Defining data types
Protocol messages are constructed from several data items. Therefore, we assume the set of all such data items as a given type.
[ITEM ]
Given the set of all items, the set of all messages MSG is the set of all possible sequences of items.
MSG == seq ITEM
Now we declare seven subsets of ITEM for the different types of data items used in the protocol: agent identifiers AID, keys KEY , seeds SED, timestamps TSP , encrypted items ENC , hashed items HSH , and acknowledgement items ACK .
Object-Z's 'disjoint' operator is used to ensure that the sets are pairwise disjoint, i.e., each element within a set is not an element of any other set. For completeness we also specify that each element in ITEM must be in one of the declared sets.
Defining supporting functions
To complete the set of basic data structures defined above, we specify various functions on messages to produce encrypted, hashed, and acknowledgement items.
The strongest behaviour required of the encryption function for our model is that, given any key, a unique encrypted item will be produced for each supplied message. This behaviour is captured by the following function enc in which an injective function is used to ensure unicity.
The one time password scheme relies on multiple hashing of the seed. To allow for this in our model we first define a hash function hash that produces a unique hashed item for each given message.
hash : MSG HSH
Secondly, we define a recursive function hash n that takes as input a message and a positive integer (n : N 1 ) and produces the result of hashing the message n times.
When n = 1, the function will return the result of hashing m once. Otherwise, hash(m) and n − 1 will be used as input for another iteration of the function.
The final function ack is that which produces a related reply as an acknowledgement, corresponding to the incrementing of the password in step 4 of the protocol. Again, an injective function is used to ensure unicity.
ack : MSG ACK

Specifying protocol roles
The protocol describes three roles agents can play: Alice, Bob, and Sam. Each role is captured within a single Object-Z class specification, including only information and operations relevant to the role it is modelling. Since the replay attack is suspected to exist in the first phase of the protocol, operations belonging to the second phase are not shown here for the sake of brevity.
The first class we model corresponds to Alice's role. Alice makes use of two identities A and B , a password seed w , the key K AS shared between Alice and Sam, the new session key K AB , and the current message msg in transit. These variables are declared accordingly in the class state schema. Initially, there is no message in transit, indicated by the empty sequence in the INIT schema. (We assume that upon initialisation, keys and seeds are assigned a 'random' value.)
Pre-state variables are undecorated and hold the value of the variables before execution of the operation, whereas post-state variables are decorated with a prime ' ' and denote the value of the variables after execution of the operation. The Object-Z symbol 'Δ' declares pre-state and poststate variables for each of the named variables, indicating that these variables may be changed by the operation.
Operation requestKey corresponds to the sending of message 1 in the 'standard notation' description of the protocol shown in Section 3. This operation requires that there is no message currently in transit (msg = ). The poststate value of the message msg consists of two items: Alice's identity, and an encrypted item containing Bob's identity encrypted using the key K AS Alice shares with Sam. (Bob's identity is enclosed in a sequence before encryption since the encrypt function operates on messages, not on individual items.)
Operation receiveKey corresponds to Alice both receiving message 2 from Sam and forwarding the key to Bob (message 3). Use of post-state variables K AB and w in the description of the incoming message msg models the way Alice receives and remembers these values. Alice treats the second item in the incoming message atomically, so we model it here simply as an encrypted item e. For the purpose of password generation, the maximum number t of times a password can be used is declared as a global constant below.
Operation acknowledge correponds to Alice receiving message 4 in order to authenticate Bob as the responding agent. The operation can occur only if the message in transit has the value shown. Since this is the final protocol operation, the message in transit is set to the empty sequence.
An agent in the server role determines which keys to use for decryption based on the agent identifiers received in the message. To capture this behaviour, the server requires a function key associating agent identifiers with keys. The server only requires one operation giveKey that corresponds to both the receipt of message 1 and subsequent distribution of the session key in step 2.
Sam is required to keep items K AB , w , and T , 'fresh' for each protocol instance. In Object-Z we specify this by keeping a record used of previously used items. In operation giveKey Sam chooses values (the post-state values) not already in this set to send in message 2. This is specified by ensuring that the set of new values intersected with the set of used values is null. Then he updates his record of used items to include these values using the union operator.
Bob's role is constructed below in a similar way, with one operation receiveKey corresponding to Bob both receiving message 3 and sending an acknowledgement in message 4 
Normally Bob would check the timestamp against the current time to ensure that the message had been received in the correct time frame. However, we simplify this in our model by having Bob check that the received timestamp T is not one he has seen before (T ∈ used ). As part of the operation Bob also updates the set of used timestamps to include the latest one received.
The ideal model of an intruder is one based on the DolevYao model [10] in which the intruder has complete control over messages sent between agents. An intruder with this capability can at any time store items from messages in transit or send a message composed of stored items. Assuming the intruder, Charles, does not know any keys for decryption of messages in transit, this behaviour is captured by the following Object-Z class.
Charles msg : MSG; stored
In Object-Z 'sequences' are actually functions from indices to sequence elements, so the operation store accesses the message items by taking the range of the message and adds them to the set of stored items. The send operation specifies that the items in the message msg in transit will be a subset '⊆' of the previously stored items.
We now specify the Protocol in which specific instances of the four agent roles (alice : Alice, bob : Bob, sam : Sam and charles : Charles) can communicate with one another. Agents' message channels msg are synchronised by way of a state invariant that ensures they are always equal. To complete the specification, each agent operation is restated as an operation of this class. 
Modelling the protocol in SAL
Using the Object-Z schema calculus [11] , specific scenarios can be verified to prove certain properties [15] . In recent research [25] the ability to apply model checking to Z-based specifications has been developed. In this paper we use our Object-Z specification as a basis for input to a model checker for automated analysis of the Kerberos-OneTime protocol. SRI International's Symbolic Analysis Laboratory is a toolkit for analysis of state transition models. In particular, SAL's model checker [9] provides an automated means of verification, involving an exhaustive search of an abstract model to check that specified requirements always hold. The main disadvantage to model checking is that an exhaustive search can lead to the state explosion problem. Therefore, the model must be abstracted without removing too much essential information. The following sections illus-trate our translation of the Object-Z specification above into SAL's notation.
Simplifying the data types
In order to reduce the size of the state space to be explored, we restrict the data types to small non-recursive structures. For example, instead of using an infinite set of 'items' as in the Object-Z specification, in SAL we define the set and restrict it to a set of thirteen natural numbers. Additionally, we reserve 0 to represent the null item XITEM. Instead of using a recursive structure to represent messages, we define two levels of messages since this is all that is required to model the particular protocol of interest. All items encrypted together or appearing in plaintext together we say belong to a sequence. For example, the ticket {A, B , K AB , H t (w ), T } KBS contains a sequence of five items. Since this is the longest sequence in the protocol, a sequence SEQ is defined as an array of five items. The null sequence XSEQ is specified by setting each position of the array to a null item. Finally, since message 3 is the longest message in the protocol, containing one plaintext sequence, and two encrypted sequences, we define a message MSG to be an array consisting of three records.
MSG: TYPE = ARRAY [1..3] OF REC;
Modelling protocol roles
To keep the SAL model consistent with the Object-Z specification, we again model each role as an individual class (or module in SAL). The state variables are declared in a similar way to those in the corresponding specification. The following module corresponds to the specification of Alice's role. Although we include some extra state information to control the order in which operations may occur to reduce analysis time, we have omitted this from the following modules for the sake of brevity. keys Alice has received. This allows us to state properties involving the history of keys received. Initially this set and the message in transit is empty as described by the INITIALIZATION predicate.
The message Alice sends in requestKey has two items: A and {B } KAS . (Once again, the primed variables are those representing the values after the operation has occured.) The first item msg' [1] is modelled by a record with no key XITEM and a sequence containing only Alice's identity alice a. The second item msg' [2] is modelled by a record with Alice's key alice kas and a sequence containing only Bob's identity alice b. Since in our model each message must consist of three records, we state that the third part of the message is the null record XREC. The receiveKey and acknowledge operations are translated in a similar way.
The specification of Charles given in Section 4.3 allows him to store any number of items from transmitted messages and to construct any message from these stored items. However, we observe from the protocol that it is unlikely for a message containing random items to be accepted by any of the honest agents due to their operations' preconditions. Therefore, we simplify the intruder here by allowing him to store each of the entire four messages only, and to subsequently replay any of these messages at the appropriate time. This is modelled using an array MSGS of four messages.
MSGS: TYPE = ARRAY [1..4] OF MSG
Given this type, the intruder is described below. Counter num is used by the intruder to keep track of which message number the protocol is up to. This is used in the store operation as an index to store the current message at the appropriate position in the array. In the send operation this counter is used to replay the appropriate message for the current point in the protocol.
Once Charles has been introduced to the system, it is important to control the ordering of operations to prevent the intruder's operations from being executed indefinitely. We do this by allowing each one of the intruder's operations to be executed once at each point in the protocol at most. However, sometimes the intruder may wish to do nothing. For this reason, we also model two other operations, nostore and nosend, that simply skip to the next operation.
In order to simulate the protocol with the intruder present, we define the main module protocol to be the asynchronous composition of each of the modules.
6 Verifying the protocol SAL allows users to specify properties in linear temporal logic (LTL), and computation tree logic (CTL) [9] . LTL formulaestate properties about each linear path induced by the transition system modelled. Two LTL operators we use are:
• G(p), stating that predicate p is always true in every state; and
• X(p), stating that p is true in the next state.
When an invalid property is specified in LTL, a counterexample is produced revealing why the model is insufficient for its desired purpose.
Properties of the protocol
There are three properties we verify to ensure the protocol in Section 3 operates as desired. The first, sharedKey, ensures that at the end of each protocol instance, both Alice and Bob share the same key for K AB .
sharedKey: THEOREM protocol |-G(state = end => alice_kab = bob_kab);
This property states that it is always the case that when the protocol is in its end state, the value Alice has for the key she shares with Bob is the same as Bob's.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, Cimato states that the use of a session key should be restricted to a short time period, avoiding the possibility of cryptanalytic attacks. Therefore, the second and third theorems ensure that once a new key has been received, it is not one that has been received before.
Earlier we introduced a set alice keys of keys containing all session keys received by Alice. The following theorem aliceFreshKey compares the value of this set before and after Alice receives the new session key in message 2. Ideally, the values will always be different; otherwise we know the new key is not fresh. The third property is similar to the second only this time we ensure the value of the new session key in message 3 is fresh for Bob. 
Finding a counterexample
When the model checker runs, it proves that the first and third properties are valid; however, it presents a counterexample for the second property summarised by the following attack on the protocol in which Charles masquerades as both the Server and Bob.
In the first four steps, Alice sets up a session key and password chain for secure communication with Bob. Charles observes and records the messages. When Alice is ready to establish a new session key for secure communication with Bob, she sends the message in step 5 which is identical to the message in step 1. During step 5, Charles intercepts the message from Alice. He then replays the message from step 2 masquerading as the Server (step 6). Alice has no way of checking whether this message is fresh. She responds in step 7. Charles intercepts this message and replays the message from step 4, successfully tricking Alice into believing that she has a secure session key and seed for secure communication with Bob (step 8). In actual fact, Alice has received a previously used session key. In the period between the two instances of the protocol above, Charles may have time to derive the stale session key, in which case the ramifications of the replay attack would be catastrophic.
In the situation above, Charles has successfully forced an old key to be used again. Even though the key is used for a short period of time once issued, Charles may have time to derive the key between the moment when the key was first issued and when he executes the replay attack. Alternatively, Charles could execute a denial-of-service attack on Alice, forcing her to respond repeatedly to bogus, but seemingly genuine, messages.
Fixing the protocol
Kerberos (Version 5) [13] includes a nonce in the first two messages of the protocol to prevent replay attacks. A nonce is a generated datum of low frequency that is difficult for others to guess. Given this property, an agent can identify the context of a message if it contains a nonce generated by them. For example, if Alice sends the randomly generated nonce N A to the Server in the initial request, it is difficult for an intruder to reply with an appropriate response ({N A , . . .} KAS ) without knowledge of the encryption key K AS .
We observe that the Kerberos-One-Time protocol can also make use of such a nonce in order to prevent the replay attack we have discovered. The following is a representation of the protocol with this added security.
Now Alice should be able to check that message 2 has not been replayed. If the message in step 2 contains a nonce different from the nonce sent in step 1, Alice will know that the message is not part of the current instance of the protocol and she will assume that a replay attack is in progress; thus, she will not continue the protocol. Including this fix in the model requires some minor changes to the original specifications of Alice and Sam. Therefore, we take advantage of Object-Z's inheritance feature and provide only those parts of class specifications that are new or those operations that must be changed. In the following class, FixedAlice, this is signified by including the name of the original class, Alice, above the state schema.
The extra state variables are: N A , declared as a nonce from an additional set NON of nonce items, and a set used to record the nonces previously used by Alice. Initially, this set is empty. In the operation requestKey, Alice now sends the nonce N A in the message msg . This nonce is chosen at the time this operation is performed; Alice ensures it is one that has not been used before (N A ∈ used ) and she updates the set of used nonces to include this one. Alice checks in operation receiveKey that the nonce she sent in message 1 is present in message 2. (Sam's model is updated similarly, simply to retrieve the new nonce from message 1 and to include it in message 2 for Alice.)
This time, after translating these changes into the SAL model, the model checker verifies that the three desired properties introduced in Section 6.1 hold. Hence, the fixed protocol is no longer susceptible to such replay attacks.
Conclusion
In this paper we have used the Object-Z formalism to present a formal specification of the Kerberos-One-Time protocol proposed for secure communication over the GSM mobile phone network. We then translated the specification into a model for analysis by the SAL model checker to confirm the existence of a suspected replay attack on the protocol. Given confirmation of the attack, we proposed a solution to the problem using an additional freshness identifier and used SAL to verify that this fix is effective. The resulting protocol is secure against such replay attacks and may be considered for use in GSM networks as originally suggested by Cimato.
